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 1 
Uneven And Combined Development: A fusion of 
Marxism and Structural Realism 
 
Abstract 
Although Justin Rosenberg’s academic writings have from the very beginning 
attempted to provide an alternative to Neorealism in the form of uneven and 
combined development, his attempts at actually replacing it with a general 
theory of his own is relatively recent.1 His initial attempts raised much interest 
and several responses. In his latest paper, Basic problems in the Theory of Uneven 
and Combined Development, part II: unevenness and political multiplicity, Rosenberg 
acknowledges that in actual fact, despite his attempts to provide an alternative to 
Neorealism, his own theory presupposed political multiplicity and therefore in 
his latest article he has sought to rectify this by providing an account of the 
emergence of the international – ‘politically fragmented space’ – one that is 
explicitly grounded in historical materialism.2 As such, it is to be welcomed. 
However, this paper argues that if we are to accept his theory of the emergence 
of multiplicity then it must provide a better explanation than other competing 
accounts. By using an alternative explanation of the rise of the international, this 
paper demonstrates that Rosenberg has failed to do this and as an alternative 
posits two trans-historical generative structures – societal stratification and the 
anarchical structure of the international.3 From these are derived the inextricable 
intertwining of the modes of production and inter-state competition. These 
provide the general tendencies of societal development which then need to be 
applied to the concrete circumstances of history. In so doing, the different 
analytical registers of genesis, structure, epoch and conjuncture and the unique 




Although Justin Rosenberg’s academic writings have from the very beginning 
attempted to provide an alternative to Neorealism in the form of uneven and 
combined development, his attempts at actually replacing it with a general trans-
historical account of human development is relatively recent. His efforts have 
thus far resulted in several key papers on the subject, which this paper divides 
into Rosenberg’s Uneven and Combined Development Part I and II (RUCD I & 
II). 5 Although this division is somewhat arbitrary, it is warranted by the fact that 
in RUCD II he acknowledges that in his earlier work he treated the existence of 
multiplicity as a presupposition thus failing to provide an account of the 
emergence of the international itself – something which RUCD II seeks to rectify.  
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 2 
Rosenberg’s latest theory of the international is extremely ambitious and wide-
ranging. In creating such a theory, Rosenberg seeks to satisfy three main 
objectives: to provide a better account of the international than those that posit 
two logics – the logic of territory and the logic of capital – as an explanation; to 
provide an alternative non-reified account of the international to that of 
Neorealism; and to furnish us with a grand narrative that explains the general 
patterns of social development throughout history. 
 
This paper reviews Rosenberg’s recent attempts to provide a trans-historical 
account of societal development that gives due recognition to the influence of the 
international. In so doing, it puts forward an alternative non-materialist account 
of the emergence of social multiplicity and the anarchical environment associated 
with this development. It then proceeds to provide an alternative approach that 
merges the key insights of both Marxism and Structural Realism. As such, it 
posits two trans-historical generative structures that account for the general 
evolution of societal development: social stratification and anarchy. From these 
two social structures, the inextricable intertwining of various modes of 
production and modes of inter-state competition are derived. Interpreting 
uneven and combined development as the complex interaction of these two 
modes then needs to be complemented by a detailed analysis of: the genesis and 
structural phases of the various modes of production/inter-state competition; a 
further breakdown into distinctive epochs during the lifetime of various modes 
of production; and, finally, a focus on determinate historical moments.6 
 
Marxist Approaches to Uneven and Combined Development 
 
The recent return by Marxists to the question of imperialism has prompted the 
greater incorporation of the dynamics of inter-state rivalry into their 
explanations. Their accounts indicate a greater appreciation that, at the 
international level, the anarchic realm in which a multiplicity of states resides 
does indeed generate a certain dynamic, but that this dynamic needs to be 
contextualized ‘within the larger theory of the capitalist mode of production and 
of its historical development’. 7  As a result, several have followed Giovanni 
Arrighi’s move and argued that international politics is a complex interweaving 
of two logics; that of geo-political competition and that of the organic tendencies 
of capitalism.8 Alex Callinicos, for example, attempts to ‘extend Marx’s method 
in Capital of elaborating a theory of the capitalist mode as a whole by 
progressively and non-deductively, introducing ever more complex 
determinations to treat the state system itself as one such determination’.9 This 
method of progressive, non-deductive concretization, Callinicos argues, has the 
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 3 
benefit of acknowledging that certain non-reducible properties pertain to the 
international level while at the same time integrating ‘all the relevant empirical 
content in an articulated structure’.10  
 
For Callincos, in order to fully understand the relations, processes and 
contradictions inherent within the capitalist system it is essential to include inter-
state relations and the domestic/international dynamics that derive from the 
complex melding with the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ capitalist relations of 
production 11  The market driven ‘horizontal’ competitive process between 
individual capitals, from which the organic tendencies of capitalism derive, not 
only increasingly exacerbates the ‘vertical’ antagonism between classes as a 
result both of the quotidian accumulation process and the periods of over 
accumulation/crisis that this horizontal competition gives rise to, but also has 
important consequences for inter-state relations. National networks of capital 
with interests far beyond the borders of the state within which they reside led to 
the eventual subordination ‘to their interests the system of sovereign territorial 
states that had developed out of the process of ‘political accumulation’ (warfare 
and state building) that dominated Europe in the later Middle Ages and the early 
modern era’. 12 As a result a fusing of the ‘logic of territory’ and ‘logic of capital’ 
occurs, in which the ‘resulting interrelations between capitalist economic 
networks that remain nationally constituted even if their reach may be global 
and specific nation states are complex, changing and irreducible to any simple 
instrumentalising of one party by another’.13 
 
For Rosenberg, however, the problem with such a formulation is that it fails to 
explain the actual fact of the international. Rather than explaining the existence 
of the multiplicity of states, Callinicos (and other Marxists) take this as a given 
and then proceed to explain both the essential social configuration within states 
in any given historical epoch and, at the same time, the particular form that inter-
state relations take in relation to the dominant mode of production pertaining to 
this period.   Rosenberg thus believes that Callinicos’ attempts at including the 
international within a Marxist analysis of history has replicated the error of 
previous Marxist accounts of focusing on ‘how the social character of this 
multiplicity (and of its causal mechanisms) has in fact varied crucially according 
to historical changes in the dominant mode of production’ and not on the 
‘transhistorical fact of geopolitical multiplicity’ itself.14 As such, it constitutes a 
second-image explanation of the international accounting for ‘the sociohistorical 
form of multiplicity …but not the fact of it’.15 
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 4 
Rosenberg not only wants to provide a better historical materialist account of the 
international than the above, his objective is also to avoid the reification of the 
international by treating the multiplicity of states, a là Neorealism, as a social fact 
in itself and as an ‘independent source of causality’.16  In attempting to do so, he 
makes an analogy with Marx’s analysis of value in volume one of Capital in 
which Marx unmasks the deeper social relations that lie behind commodity 
exchange. As Rosenberg points out, Marx aims to reveal the inverted and reified 
form that commodity exchange has assumed.17 The surface level of commodity 
exchange gives an appearance of a relationship between things whose value 
seems to emanate from the nature of the products themselves. The real social 
relation between producers is thus disguised through the mediation of the 
market and the monetized form that exchange takes, which ‘conceals the social 
character of private labour and the social relations between the individual 
workers, by making those relations appear as relations between material 
objects’.18  This process of objectification hides the true basis of exchange values, 
which is not some innate material quality associated with the product itself but 
rather it is the amount of ‘congealed labour-time’ (or more accurately, the 
‘labour-time socially necessary for its production’) embodied within a 
commodity relative to other commodities. 19  But this ‘determination of the 
magnitude of value by labour-time’...is…’a secret hidden under the apparent 
movements in the relative values of commodities. Its discovery destroys the 
semblance of the merely accidental determination of the magnitude of the value 
of the products of labour’.20  
 
In a similar fashion, Rosenberg seeks to unravel the reified form of geopolitical 
competition devoid of any generative sociological processes that Neorealism 
presents to us. He does so by situating geopolitics within a process of uneven 
and combined development which is posited as a ‘sociological characteristic of 
all historical development…entailing, as it does, an inner differentiation and 
interactivity to the historical process’.21 By viewing societal development as both 
uneven and combined ensures that we don’t fall into the trap of treating societies 
as ontological singularities, shifting the focus toward multiplicity, interactivity 
and multilinearity.  Historical development is thus a constantly evolving 
cumulative product arising from a complex of interactions between endogenous 
and exogenous processes. Geopolitics is no longer viewed as an autonomous 
sphere of interaction but rather derives from the fact that all societies ‘confront 
the fact that the human world extends beyond themselves, and that the resultant 
imperative to manage the “outside” world, if only minimally for reasons of 
survival, compels them into interaction with each other’.22 Such interaction is 
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said to ‘super-add(s) a lateral field of causality over and above the “domestic” 
determinations arising from each and every one of the participant societies’.23 
 
Rosenberg’s Version of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
In order to achieve these objectives Rosenberg employs Trotsky’s theory 
of uneven and combined development originally used to explain why Russia had 
failed to follow the unilinear path of capitalist development predicted by Marx 
and Engels.  The explanation, of course, lay in the very fact that capitalism had 
already occurred elsewhere. As a result the revolutionary effects of this mode of 
production in virgin territory would not mirror that of the original ‘capitalist 
pathfinder’. 24 Driven by the ‘whip of external necessity’ states desperately seek 
to catch up with the lead states lest their relative decline should end in their 
demise. Yet, in tandem with this imperative that states find impossible to ignore, 
comes the opportunity to use the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ to catch up 
through the adoption of contemporaneous technologies thus ‘skipping a whole 
series of intermediate stages’. 25 
 
Moreover, the birth pangs are somewhat unique for each case: the very fact that 
capitalist development does not occur in isolation means that in each country ‘a 
peculiar combination of different stages in the historic process’…emerge, so 
that…’Their development as a whole acquires a planless, complex, combined 
character’.26 As capitalism reaches out beyond its original borders an unstable 
fusing of old and new occurs; not only do unique amalgams of different modes 
of production arise but even more interesting combinations of class alignments 
occur. 27  In other words, this geographical expansion ruptures the ossified 
structures of these societies not along some unilinear and predictable path, but in 
such a manner that classes associated with a previous historical epoch not only 
subsist but actually act as the midwives of capitalism withi  their state – ‘Unable 
to avoid the imperative of industrialization, but unwilling to dissolve the (non-
capitalist) basis of their own rule, they mobilized the power of the state to 
combine the one with the other, generating in each case an unstable sociological 
“amalgam”’.28   
 
Rosenberg’s initial work in this area focused on encompassing geopolitical 
competition in the wider context of socio-economic development. In so doing, 
the geopolitical is no longer viewed as subsisting autonomously with the causal 
dynamics of power competition emanating from the anarchic realm of the 
international – treated as an isolatable social fact, separate from the wide ranging 
and complex array of socio-economic dynamics occurring within and between 
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 6 
societies. Rather, geopolitics is seen as an integral aspect of the uneven and 
combined developmental process.  
 
But in order for uneven and combined development to explain these dynamics it 
has to be temporally extended beyond its original context of capitalism to 
include the variety of socio-economic formations that came before this particular 
mode of production. Development is still posited ‘ontologically as the subject 
matter of the analysis, it identifies the evolution of social structures in historical 
time as the basis of its explanatory method’.29 But, unevenness is now viewed as 
a general transhistorical characteristic of development as a result of the varied 
pace of evolution amongst societies. Combined development is also shorn of its 
original meaning. Trotsky was referring to the extension of capitalist relations 
from the vanguard state outward to those societies still operating under earlier 
modes of production and the manner in which this revolutionary socio-economic 
form impinged upon earlier social forms generating unique fusions of social 
structures. As others have already pointed out, in Rosenberg’s earlier writings 
(RUCD Part I), combined development takes on several meanings: the 
‘coexistence and interactive development of all societies throughout history’; ‘an 
interdependence of “the structures of material and cultural life”; and, finally the 
process so well articulated by Trotsky, the melding of capitalism with various 
preceding modes of production to produce unique socio-economic structures.30   
 
In his initial works, Rosenberg contended that this temporally extended version 
of uneven and combined development could supersede the neorealist 
explanation of geopolitics, asserting that the ‘very existence of “geopolitics”, its 
imputed transhistorical “logics” and its varying forms and causal weight can all 
be explained via a generative sociological presupposition – the first two by 
reasoning from the general abstraction of “uneven and combined development” 
and the third by developing concrete abstractions of the latter’s particular 
historical configurations’. 31  But Trotsky’s version of uneven and combined 
development actually presupposed both the multiplicity of the international and 
the geopolitical competition that exists in this anarchic environment. The ‘whip 
of external necessity’ was none other than the geopolitical competition between 
states that derives from the imperative to survive in an anarchic international 
environment. 32  As others have pointed out, ‘The transformative impact of 
geopolitical competition on the internal constitution of societies was a theme 
running throughout Trotsky’s work’.33 Rosenberg’s initial version of uneven and 
combined development did nothing to fundamentally alter this element of 
Trotsky’s theory. Trotsky’s version of uneven and combined development 
provided the potential for an excellent trans-historical account of the mechanism 
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 7 
through which shifting balances of power occur between states. Moreover, it 
focused our attention on the variety and complexity of amalgams of modes of 
production particularly during transitions from one historical epoch to another 
and the concomitant combination of class alliances that emerge as a result of this 
process. What it did not explain is the multiplicity of the international itself and 
the security dilemma between states that is said to attend this multiplicity.34 
 
In order to provide a trans-historical account of the evolution of society that 
rivals Neorealism, Rosenberg in RUCD Part I presents a temporally extended 
version of Tr tsky’s uneven and combined development. In so doing, Rosenberg 
avoids the pitfall of other sociological approaches of treating societies as if they 
were ontological singularities. Instead, the focus is on ‘social development 
conceptualized as a differentiated but nonetheless ontological whole’.35 Yet, his 
earlier version of the theory fails to actually explain multiplicity itself and the 
security dilemma that is said to obtain as a result. In his most recent paper RUCD 
Part II), Rosenberg attempts to rectify this weakness, the details of which are 
given below. 
 
Rosenberg’s Uneven and Combined Development Part II 
 
Rosenberg’s second attempt at explaining the multiplicity of the international 
using uneven and combined development sees the application of his approach 
applied to the late pre-historic period. Part II of RUCD rectifies his original 
application of uneven and combined development which pre-supposed the 
existence of multiplicity and had thus led to a theoretical impasse wherein his 
work provided an improved account of geopolitical balancing but was inherently 
incapable of explaining the emergence of the international itself. In so doing, he 
makes a crucial distinction between social multiplicity (two or more initially non- 
hierarchical groups) and political multiplicity (vertical social differentiation 
within units). The former is said to antecede the latter. This represents a critically 
important move by Rosenberg because it then allows him to argue that uneven 
and combined development preceded the ‘political’ (i.e. hierarchical social 
groups). Indeed, more than this, uneven and combined development explains 
the emergence of political multiplicity itself. 
 
In this account, the late pre-historical period is marked by the evolution from 
hunter gatherer societies to sedentary ones – from a pre-international system to 
an international one. But prior to this change, Rosenberg contends, the social 
world constituted by these hunter gatherer bands (HGBs) was highly uneven as 
a result of geographical variation and the adaptive strategies adopted by these 
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 8 
groups alongside evolutionary variation with groups acquiring certain capacities 
– ‘such as language, control of fire, invention of clothing and artificial shelter’ at 
different times. 36  In addition, he contends that these societies were also 
‘combined’ through the necessity of exogamous biological reproduction. These 
‘extending networks of consanguinity’ are said to have ‘provided the basis for 
periodic gatherings, shared language and security against environmental 
stress’.37 
 
However, a radical rupture occurred in this social fabric with the arrival of 
sedentary agricultural groups and their ability to produce and preserve a surplus 
for use during less fertile periods. This change in productive capacity is said to 
have heralded the social consolidation of these groups and a sharpening of inter-
societal divisions. It stimulated a shift in emphasis where the focus was more on 
the protection of the surplus from other groups and less on the need for 
exogamous links for biological reproduction (given that group size had grown 
with surplus production capability). The logic of security is said to change ‘from 
dispersal to nucleation’ as a result of the rise of self-reproducing, self-sustaining 
groups that need to protect their surplus in order to survive.  
 
Most importantly for Rosenberg’s thesis is that this change in productive 
capacity heralded the rise of political multiplicity.  It is argued that some of the 
surplus could now be exchanged for ‘durable luxuries’ and the differential access 
to such goods ‘plays an important role in…[the]…consolidation of internal 
hierarchy’.38  Authority within these embryonic sedentary groups issues from 
access to these ‘prestige goods’ which in turn are acquired from outside through 
the exchange of accumulated surplus, thus, ‘external trade facilitates hierarchy,; 
and hierarchy, by generating ”a constant need for new and exclusive prestige 
goods” promotes trade’.39 For Rosenberg, the very origins of political entities are 
thus associated with the interaction (via the trading of goods) of the various 
social entities that pertained at the time.   Uneven and combined development is 
therefore inextricably linked to the rise of political multiplicity as the 
combination of the logic of security and economic interaction of these societies 
leads to a ‘hardening inside/outside division…[that]… necessarily congeals into 
finite entities’.40 
 
Basic Problems of Rosenberg’s Uneven and Combined Development Part II 
 
Rosenberg’s approach stands out for giving due recognition to the prolonged 
influence that the international anarchical structure has had throughout history. 
Rosenberg’s endeavours to both produce a more generalized version of Trotsky’s 
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uneven and combined development and integrate into this the geopolitical 
dynamics of inter-state competition are to be lauded. However, the costs 
incurred in so doing may be unacceptably high in relation to its productiveness 
and/or introduce internal inconsistencies such that the theory itself is debased. 
As has been pointed out previously by others, in Rosenberg’s earlier writings, 
combined development takes on several meanings: the ‘coexistence and 
interactive development of all societies throughout history’; ‘an interdependence 
of “the structures of material and cultural life”; and, finally the ‘combination’ of 
capitalism with various preceding modes of production to produce unique socio-
economic structures.41 As others have pointed out, Trotsky’s use of the term 
‘combination’ is quite specific and should be differentiated from the more 
general term ‘articulation’. Rather than simply denoting an interconnection 
between various modes of production, combination, should be regarded as ‘a 
particular subset of articulation in which one of the modes … impels the 
simultaneous transformation and reconstitution of the other'.42 But in RUCD Part 
II, this latter aspect completely drops out and, if interdependence is present at all, 
it is in an extremely weak form. This then raises the question whether Rosenberg 
has arrogated the term ‘uneven and combined development’ for a theory that 
bears little or no resemblance to the original.  
 
Indeed, given the even greater level of generalization in RUCD II, with regard to 
Rosenberg’s version of uneven and combined development, a more appropriate 
nomenclature would be ‘varied and interactive development’. His account of the 
late pre-historic period hinges upon a comparison of societies marked by the 
presence and absence of certain geographical and/or evolutionary features. This 
variation bears no resemblance to Trotsky’s concept of uneven development in 
terms of progressive modes of production. The tension is quite clear throughout 
the paper with Rosenberg often using the two terms – variation and unevenness - 
interchangeably. Similarly, the term combination, which for Trotsky denoted the 
unique amalgams of socioeconomic structures arising from the global expansion 
of capitalism, in RUCD Part II refers to simple exchange between pre-historic 
societies.  
 
Such dilution of terms is also apparent in Rosenberg’s definition of development, 
based as it is on one of Marx and Engels’ more general outlines of development 
in The German Ideology which explains the two way process whereby human 
beings shape nature in order to satisfy their needs and wants and in 
appropriating and transforming nature the ‘species being’ is also transformed, 
there is therefore ‘a constant interaction between subject and object’ such that 
human nature ‘itself is the ever-changing product of human activity, i.e. of 
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history’.43 Because production is a social activity involving the cooperation of 
human beings, the production of the means of subsistence becomes a dual 
relationship – ‘on the one hand as a natural, and on the other as a social 
relationship’44. This implies that certain methods of producing material needs 
will require certain types of cooperation between the individuals of the 
community concerned. At any particular stage in the history of a community 
these forces of production (means of production i.e. raw materials and 
instruments of production combined with labour power) will have reached a 
particular level and will require a corresponding division of labour within that 
community.45 It is then rather simple to construct a highly abstract generalization 
concerning the interaction of societies with different forms and levels of 
productive capacity – uneven and combined development. 
 
However, the Preface To A Contribution To The Critique of Political Economy gives 
the more detailed and oft-cited specification ‘In the social production of their 
existence, men enter into definite, necessary relations, which are independent of 
their will, namely, relations of production corresponding to a determinate stage 
of development of their material forces of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation on which there arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which there correspond definite forms of social consciousness.46 If Rosenberg had 
used this more detailed version of development, it would at least provide us 
with falsifiable statements on which to assess the validity of his theoretical claims. 
 
In fact, there are several interpretations concerning this and other passages: the 
technological thesis, the mixed mode thesis; and the political thesis. The 
controversy centres on what should be taken as the primary determining 
influence on history, the agency that provides the overall explanation for 
historical change in social relations. What comprises the totality of relations of 
production is not altogether clear from the passage and neither is the precise 
meaning of 'corresponding', hence the various interpretations of historical 
materialism. 
 
The technological interpretation of historical materialism proposes that the forces 
of production explain why particular relations in society pertain at any particular 
moment in time – ‘The primary thesis is that the nature of a set of production 
relations is explained by the level of development of the productive forces 
embraced by it (to a far greater extent than vice versa)’.47 Where relations of 
production refer to both a division of labour and the ownership of the means of 
production (defined as the instruments of production and the raw materials 
Page 10 of 38
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gieh Email: criacis@hermes.cam.ac.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
 11 
requiring transformation). This interpretation lends itself to a functionalist 
account of Marxism in which a set of production relations are said to obtain 
‘because they suit the development of the [production] forces’.48 The mixed mode 
approach views both the forces and relations of production as constituting the 
economic structure of society that pertains in any given epoch. Human agency is 
viewed as a major determinant of socio-economic change, but new social 
formations will be enabled and/or constrained by the productive capacities that 
pertain at that any given point in time. In other words, the ‘relation of 
correspondence between forces and relations of production do not involve the 
causal primacy of either term but rather their mutual presuppositions’. 49  
Alternatively, other Marxists argue for the primacy of relations of production 
(classes) as the driving force in history.50 Given these various interpretations, this 
paper will generally refer to the mode of production without differentiating 
between them (excluding the primacy of productive forces which very few now 
adhere to), because the emphasis here is on the possible fusion of Structural 
Realism and Marxism – regardless of which variant is chosen. 
 
By employing a rather nebulous definition of development, Rosenberg has 
avoided many of the debates concerning exactly how societies actually do 
develop, particularly with regard to transitions from one mode of production to 
another. There may well be both endogenous and exogenous processes occurring 
that generate social and economic change, but what weighting should be given to 
one compared to the other is a far more difficult question. For example, in 
relation to feudalism, the debate continues as to whether the transition to 
capitalism was internally generated as a result of a change in the internal 
configuration of social forces as a result of class struggle that shook ‘loose the 
small producer from feudal exploitation’ and that ‘‘from the petty mode of 
production (in the degree to which it secures independence of action, and social 
differentiation in turn develops within it) that capitalism is born’.51 Or was it 
essentially a top down process where, as a result of the limited success of English 
peasant rebellion and their ‘failure to establish essentially freehold control over 
the land, the landlords were able to engross, consolidate and enclose, to create 
large farms and to lease them to capitalist tenants who could afford to make 
capital investments’?52 Was it instead long-distance trade acting as a ‘creative 
force, bringing into existence a system of production for exchange alongside the 
old feudal system of production for use’...which…’naturally began to act upon 
each other’?53  Or was it, indeed, the result of a technological developments 
utilized by ‘small groups of farmers, manufacturers in the city and some 
merchants, who began to exploit labour in a new way’…which ’occurs within 
feudalism, but in contradiction to feudalism’. 54  Without explicating further 
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precisely what is meant by uneven and combined development and moving 
from such a highly abstract schema to concrete analyses of historical change, the 
charge leveled at UCD that its ‘suggestiveness is equaled only by {its} 
elusiveness’ may have been an unfair charge to lay at Trotsky’s door, but unless 
further specification is given, RUCD is in danger of fitting the bill.55 
 
As Perry Anderson reminds us, there are two distinct phenomena that Marx 
investigates: the genesis of a mode of production; and the structure of a mode of 
production. 56  For example, the generative processes, such as primitive 
accumulation, may be necessary for the emergence of a mode of production, such 
as capitalism, but not necessarily for its continuance. 57  Moreover, it is entirely 
possible that ‘the same articulated structure may come into existence by a 
number of different “paths”. The constitutive elements which compose it can be 
released in variant ways and sequences, from previous modes of production, 
before interlocking to form a coherent and self-reproducing system as such’. 58 
Trotsky’s analysis focuses on the latter structural phase and, in particular, the 
inherent tendency of capitalism to expand in search of new avenues for 
investment for the expansion of production and new consumer markets for the 
absorption of the goods produced which would eventually lead to every corner 
of the world being affected by this revolutionary mode of production. These 
tendencies assume a hypertrophied form during crisis periods of 
overaccumulation, at which point capitalists desperately seek spatio-temporal 
fixes for their accumulated surpluses leading to, amongst other things, intense 
development of productive capacity and consumer markets in hitherto relatively 
less integrated regions. 59  Trotsky’s contribution was not to challenge those 
tendencies of capitalism that Marx had identified, but to indicate how the 
spillover of capital had dramatically different effects depending upon the socio-
economic structure of the society in question. But in addition, he also 
incorporated the geopolitical logic of necessity that impels states to catch up with 
other states lest they decline and possibly even fade away. State elites were thus 
viewed as opening up to capitalism in order to harness the accumulative capacity 
of capitalism for their own ends. The ‘logic’ of capital accumulation in unison 
with the ‘logic’ of geopolitics explained the patterns of uneven and combined 
development that Trotsky so perceptively observed. There are thus two avenues 
open to researchers wishing to deploy the insights of Trotsky’s theory of uneven 
and combined development:  the genesis and structure of a particular mode of 
production. Of course, this is in terms of research focus, but would eventually 
lead to the combination of the two to fully explain the emergence and 
maintenance of a given historical epoch. 
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In relation to the generative phase, UCD can be deployed to explain the 
embryonic emergence of new modes of production and the political-legal 
superstructure that subsequently evolves. In order to do this, it needs to engage 
in the debates surrounding such transitional phases, clearly identifying the key 
constitutive elements of the transformative process. Moreover, it needs to prove 
that the unevenness and combined nature of development is actually a 
significant factor during such phases. That development is uneven and combined 
is not in dispute, but to avoid descent into facile truisms the research needs to 
demonstrate whether or not it is a significant factor for the emergence of the new 
mode of production and, if so, to what degree. The second approach would be to 
examine the structural phase of the embryonic mode of production, identifying 
its constitutive elements and how these are then combined with older modes of 
production across space as a result of the uneven nature of development. Under 
Rosenberg’s schema, this may be in terms of simply interacting and affecting 
other societies without fundamentally altering their modes of production or it 
may lead to the emergence of unique amalgams of new and old modes heralding 
unique political-legal superstructures that emerge from these fusions. In other 
words, Rosenberg, a là Trotsky, needs to analyse the fundamental characteristics 
of the new socio-economic form that occurred in place A at time T1 and how this 
impacted upon places B, C, D… at time T2, T3, T4… 
 
Rosenberg thus needs to further differentiate (and this may be his next 
development) between the transformative and structural phases of any given 
mode of production. He has also been criticized for an approach that involves a 
general theory of societal development at one end and detailed conjunctural 
analysis at the other. 60  As Callinicos points out, it therefore ‘occludes the 
specification of a level of conceptualization intermediate between the two’ – the 
distinctive phases (epochs) during the lifetime of a mode of production. 
According to Callinicos, he uses ‘a too undifferentiated concept of the 
conjunctural…developments, shifts, alterations which, however dramatic or 
extensive they may be, nonetheless remain changes within the existing historical 
form of society rather marking a fundamental ‘‘epochal’’ transformation in the 
nature of that society itself’. In other words, any change that leaves the mode of 
production in place is the proper object of conjunctural analysis. This fails to 
distinguish between two kinds of intermediary analysis that, while of a higher 
resolution than general theorizing about the capitalist mode, operate at different 
levels, respectively, that of a specific phase of capitalist development and that of 
a determinate historical moment – in other words, of epoch and conjuncture 61. In 
order to further develop his theory, several extra levels of analysis are thus 
required to provide a full understanding of the historical process: the 
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transformative and structural phases of any given mode of production; 
distinctive phases (epochs) during the lifetime of a mode of production; and, 
finally, conjunctural analysis that identifies a ‘determinate historical moment’.62 
 
In addition, Rosenberg needs to add a further constitutive element to the process 
of combined development. Historical analysis indicates that modes of production 
contain within them ‘a remanence of the legacy of one mode of production with 
an epoch dominated by another, and a reactivation of its spell in the passage to a 
third….the concatenation of the ancient and feudal modes of production are 
necessary to yield the capitalist mode of production in Europe…the actual 
movement of history is never a simple change-over from one pure mode of 
production to another: it is always composed of a complex series of social 
formations in which a number of modes of production are enmeshed together, 
under the dominance of one of them’.63 We thus have an even more complex 
form of analysis where the researcher is not only required to identify the 
interaction between endogenous and exogenous processes, but also needs to 
identify certain remnant elements of much earlier modes of production whose 
significance resurfaces during the genesis of a new phase of development – le 
mort saisit le vif.64 
 
RUCD and the Realist Moment 
 
Can Rosenberg’s theory of uneven and combined development successfully 
integrate an explanation of the geopolitical into a more general account of the 
socio-economic development of human society while providing a trans-historical 
account of social change? With RUCD Part II, Rosenberg’s thesis is that a change 
in productive capacity heralded the rise of political multiplicity. However, one 
could equally argue that a realist moment occurred prior to this accumulation of 
surplus. Indeed, Rosenberg himself acknowledges that ‘Archaeological evidence 
suggests that human settlement first occurred only sporadically, in places where 
natural abundance allowed for year-round foraging subsistence’.65 It is equally 
plausible that consolidation of social groups began in these areas – the land was 
fertile enough to support settlement and eventually population growth which 
extirpated 66  the need for exogamous social relations. 67  Associated with this 
process was the need to protect the fertile territory that enabled this expansion of 
the social group. This, combined with the fact that ‘Sedentary units are much 
more vulnerable to attack than mobile units’, led to an increased emphasis 
concerning group security.68 In the absence of any provision of protection from a 
higher body and/or inter-group agreement, an anarchical environment 
developed – one in which the logic of security was that of self-help.  
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In other words, one can argue that the ‘anarchic moment’ occurred prior to the 
production of surplus. Indeed, there is evidence that at the end of the first stage 
of global colonization that significant cultural change occurred, such as, ‘burying 
their dead and looking after the sick and the old’.69 The settling on fertile plains 
may have acted as a further catalyst for this process of ethno-genesis, group 
identity formation and the ‘hardening of inside/outside’ divisions possibly 
combined with the rise of exclusionary ‘identity politics’. If one accepts this 
sequence of events, then the emergence of anarchy is not dependent upon the 
accrual of surplus but by the inversion of social relations – the move away from 
exogamy to endogamy and some limited form of ethnogenesis.70 A disjuncture 
occurs in the process of uneven and combined development wherein the inter-
societal relations which were marked by reproductive interdependency were 
slowly replaced by a developing anarchic environment of self-reproducing 
survival units.  
 
It is striking that Rosenberg uses several passages from the German Ideology, yet 
he fails to refer to the Formen section of the Grundrisse which concentrates on 
early/pre-historical forms. This section bears a close resemblance to Rosenberg’s 
outline of societal formation but differs in highly significant ways. Indeed, much 
of Rosenberg’s thesis is implicit in Marx’s explanation, but the chronology gives 
more support to the above brief sketch than it does to RUCD Part II. First, the 
initial mode of life chimes with Rosenberg’s description of small migratory 
groups and Marx then adds that ‘except possibly in a natural environment so 
especially fertile that they sit like monkeys on a tree’.71 But one can also find 
support in Marx’s writings for the separation of the embryonic growth of 
societies and the growth in productive capacities. Marx argues that the formation 
of the first communities arise from influences other than production – ‘the 
natural community, appears not as a result of, but as a presupposition for the 
communal appropriation and utilization of land...This naturally arisen clan 
community, or, if one will, pastoral society, is the first presupposition - the 
communality of blood, language, customs - for the appropriation of the objective 
conditions of their life, and of their life's reproducing and objectifying 
activity...The real appropriation through the labour process happens under these 
presuppositions, which are not themselves the product of labour, but appear as 
its natural or divine presuppositions’.72 Further on in the Grundrisse, Marx adds 
that ‘The only barrier which the community can encounter in relating to the 
natural conditions of production – the earth – as to its own property (if we jump 
ahead to the settled peoples) is another community, which already claims it as its 
own organic body. Warfare is therefore one of the earliest occupations of each of 
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these naturally arisen communities, both for the defence of their property and for 
obtaining new property’.73   
 
Moreover, reflecting on the initial establishment of Rome, Marx argues that ‘The 
aim of all these communities is survival; i.e. reproduction of the individuals who 
comprise it as proprietors’. The survival imperative inherent in these communities 
perforce drives them toward ‘new production and destruction of the old 
form…[where]… the advance of population is already under way. If this is to be 
corrected, then colonization, and that in turn requires wars of conquest. With 
that, slaves etc. Also, e.g., enlargement of the ager publicus, and therewith the 
patricians who represent the community etc..74  
 
One could thus argue that an anarchical structure arises from the inversion of 
social relations earlier identified. This inside/outside relation is then exacerbated 
by the ‘unresolvable uncertainty’ of intentions that exists in the absence of a 
higher authority.75 Such a situation would satisfy the two conditions that Waltz 
identifies as necessary for inter-societal competition (geopolitics) to pertain – 
‘that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive’.76   
Such an interpretation still meets Rosenberg’s objective of conceptualizing social 
development as a differential but nonetheless ontological whole. The shift from 
exogamy to endogamy, self-reproducing and self-sufficient groups leads to social 
change that involves both deeper differentiation and the emergence of an 
anarchical structure which paradoxically binds these societies in a competitive 
community of fate. 
 
However, initially the degree of interaction would have obviously varied both 
inter-regionally and intra-regionally. Following the arguments laid out in The 
Logic of Anarchy, such conditions would not at first be satisfied system-wide, but 
would initially emerge as various localized sub-systems in which ‘adjacency 
compensates for low levels of interaction capability’.77 The degree of interaction 
within sub-systems would be significantly higher than that between sub-systems. 
But eventually, increases in interaction capacity (the ‘absolute quality of 
technological and societal capabilities across the system’) and sub-system 
expansion would lead to the emergence of one unified system.78 In relation to the 
latter sections of this paper, this systemic interaction capacity is clearly related to 
what Michael Mann refers to as the ‘infrastructural power’ power of the states 
within the system, and this in itself will reflect the level of productive forces at 
that point.79 Moreover, such systemic societal capabilities will reflect the relations 
of production and the degree to which surplus accumulation relies on extra-
economic coercion.80 
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If such is the case, then a competitive inter-societal dynamic can be explained 
without initial reference to the revolutionary effects of surplus accumulation and 
precedes the emergence of the succeeding social stratification that Rosenberg 
describes. Indeed, one could argue that the initial stratification of these societies 
resulted from the emergence of a division of labour based upon protection 
whereby leadership was no longer based on authority but power as a result of 
their new ability to ‘coerce their followers’.81 For Rosenberg, the sequence of 
events is as follows: initial social existence of HGBs; settlement on fertile 
territories; production of surplus; logic of security evolves from dispersal to 
nucleation and emergence of social multiplicity; trade in surplus and need to 
protect surplus; social differentiation arising from accumulation of wealth 
spurred on by exchange in prestige goods; congealing of inside/outside division; 
mimetic moment the initiation of the emulative process and the emergence of 
political multiplicity. 
 
In so doing, Rosenberg associates the emergence of the international with the 
emergence of political multiplicity. However, the main characteristics of the 
international are that it is an anarchic environment within which units seeking to 
survive reside. What we then have is the following sequence. The existence of 
multiplicity in the form of hunter gatherer bands; some of these settle on highly 
fertile land; immobility leads to greater vulnerability and the survival imperative 
leads to the protection of territory from those outside of the group; the growth in 
the size of the group (that these fertile areas permit) plus the increased 
vulnerability leads to nucleation and the emergence of social multiplicity (i.e. 
groups reliant on endogamy more than exogamy); the emergence of the realist 
moment – the security seeking behaviour by one group is replicated through-out 
various sub-systems, i.e. the mimetic moment, initiation of the emulative process, 
and eventually, once interaction capacity reaches the required level, between 
sub-systems creating an international anarchical structure; surplus accumulation 
begins possibly spurred on by territorialisation (ability to store and protect 
surplus); differential access to surplus arising from the division of labour; 
differentiation exacerbated by the trade in prestige goods. 
 
Thus one can postulate that inter-group rivalry emerged as a result of the need to 
secure fertile territory which in itself had allowed for population growth to a 
level which eradicated the need for ‘continuous symbiosis with neighbours’.82 
This social nucleation concomitant with settlement leads to the congealing of 
inside/outside social divisions and the emulation of this process by others 
leading to the emergence of the ‘international’ i.e. an anarchic environment 
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populated by units seeking to survive. In other words, a realist moment 
antecedes the surplus accumulation moment. Inter-unit competition/conflict 
would then be exacerbated by the accumulation of surplus.  
 
Rosenberg’s work is to be lauded for its analytical rigor and appreciation of the 
importance of the international anarchical structure, yet this paper questions his 
attempt to produce an historical materialist account of its origins. In what follows, 
this paper seeks to retain these insights concerning the trans-historical nature of 
anarchy and the inextricable intertwining of the domestic and international. But 
a distinction needs to be made between: the deep structure of anarchy (the 
absence of a higher authority and an environment populated by units seeking to 
survive); the inter-unit competition that this fosters (leading to external 
stratification in terms of degrees of relative power capabilities); and internal 
stratification (in terms of the distribution of surplus extraction, reflecting the 
relations of production). 
 
A Fusion of Marxism and Realism 
 
The objectives and methods of Neorealism and Marxism differ to such an extent 
that any attempt at fusing the two would appear to be futile.  For Waltz, a theory 
must be both parsimonious and non-reductionist. To this end, he is seeking an 
abstract theory of international reality, which, although it may only be a 
simplification of that reality, can nevertheless still explain and predict state 
behaviour. The intention of such an abstraction is to illuminate and clarify the 
major causes of state behaviour at the international level: 
 
The theoretical strategy is to make the fewest assumptions possible and 
use the smallest imaginable number of explanatory variables. Structural 
realists self-consciously sacrifice richness and depth for a simple, 
rigorous theory that holds widely across time and space.83 
 
Waltz’s theory is thus intentionally bereft of any detailed analysis of the 
domestic characteristics of states, such as culture, ideology, and political 
institutions. These characteristics are only considered in terms of how they 
enhance or diminish the power of the state in the international arena (but state 
behaviour in general will be unaffected in the long term). Waltz is fully aware 
that providing an account of the constitutions and processes within states will 
bring us closer to social reality, but this would involve a ‘move away from a 
theory claiming explanatory power to a less theoretical system promising greater 
descriptive accuracy’. 84  
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Waltz’s version of Neorealism informs us of two major recurrences: first, that, 
‘international politics reflects the distribution of national capabilities, a 
proposition daily borne out’; and second, that, ‘the balancing of power by some 
states against others recurs. Realist theory predicts that balances disrupted will 
one day be restored’.85 Viewed from this perspective, much criticism directed at 
Neorealism is misplaced because it has assumed too much of the theory. As 
Waltz has elsewhere stated, as both an explanatory and predictive theory, 
Neorealism is extremely limited in what it can and cannot predict; but what it 
can do is, ‘explain certain big and important things’. 86 
 
As Rosenberg points out, Waltz thus warrants the abstraction of the international 
from the social by referring to the causal determinacy of the anarchical structure 
of the international environment upon the behaviour of the subject under 
analysis – states and the patterns of interaction between them. Yet, its weakness 
is that it may tell us that states will engage in power balancing, but it tells us 
nothing about the manner in which power is accrued or anything about the 
manner in which it will be projected. 
 
However, the last decade has witnessed a move by so called neo-classical realists 
away from highly abstract theorizing. Such writers regard anarchy as a general 
permissive condition. In so doing, ‘Since anarchy and polarity do not determine 
the actions of states (as acknowledged by structural realists as well), neo-and 
postclassical realists argue that we need to incorporate other variables as well’.87 
Neo-classical realists still emphasise the importance of the international structure 
and distribution of power, but they locate ‘causal properties at the structural and 
unit levels, the unit-level factors help to explain state external behavior’.88 
 
Much of this work chimes with the earlier work of the Structural Realists who 
made important adjustments to Waltz’s Neorealism, some of which this paper 
seeks to incorporate. First, they make a key distinction between deep structure 
(‘organizational principle plus functional differentiation of units) and 
distributional structure (systemic patterns in the distribution of unit attributes). 
Second, they introduce a new system wide concept of interaction capacity. 
Waltz’s assumption that the competitive pressure arising from the anarchical 
structure will lead to homogeneous units relies on a high level of system-wide 
interaction capacity to convey the competitive pressures induced by the anarchic 
environment. If the interaction capacity is sufficiently low, functional 
differentiation will therefore persist. Moreover, the historical record would seem 
to indicate that, ‘the process of emulation does not necessarily lead to the 
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increasing homogenization of political units’, rather, it often leads to 
hybridization of existing and new methods of warfare and production (echoes of 
UCD here).89  
 
This redefinition of the deep structure has important ramifications for the two 
alternative theories presented in this paper. As is well known, Waltz’s version of 
the international political structure contains three components:: ‘the organizing 
principle of the international system, plus the functional differentiation of units, 
plus the distribution of capabilities across units’. 90 But because the competitive 
pressures generated by the anarchical structure lead to the emergence of like 
units, functional differentiation drops out and Waltz thus famously asserts that 
‘international structures vary only through a change of organizing principle or, 
failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units’.91 Much of the work by 
the above two schools has involved the re-introduction of this second component 
of the international political structure. But within these works there exists two 
different approaches. The Structural Realists view the functional differentiation 
of political units as dictating ‘the character of the anarchic deep structure of the 
system’, rather than ‘simply mediating the deep structural effects of anarchy’ as 
John Ruggie does.92 They thus argue that the ‘ordering principle of anarchy, has 
remained unchanged throughout world history. But by incorporating the 
additional structural component of functional differentiation we are also able to 
identify that there can be change in the deep structure of the international 
system’. 93 
 
For Rosenberg, the latter form of structural realism should appeal. It not only 
brings in the important variable of interaction capacity, the initial emergence of 
sub-systems leading to a fully international anarchical structure, but also the 
functional differentiation of units and its effects on the deep structure of the 
international system. One could foresee Rosenberg arguing that the emergence of 
the anarchical order arises from a political multiplicity that originates in the 
production of surplus. States slowly but surely emerge from this political 
multiplicity and the form of these states will vary according to the mode of 
production that pertains within these units. But rather than argue for the 
continuance of a deep anarchical structure throughout history as Structural 
Realists do, it could be argued that the very nature of anarchy depends upon 
what Teschke refers to as the mode of operation of geopolitical orders and this itself 
is governed by the dominant mode of production within states.94 
 
The following argues that an alternative version of Structural Realism to that of 
melding Structural Realism with Rosenberg’s theory, is possible. Such an 
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approach is similar to that of Callinicos’ in that it argues that the anarchical 
structure of the international environment does indeed constitute an 
independent generative structure. Indeed, in the abstract, we can posit at least 
two trans-historical generative structures throughout most of human 
development: the internal one of social stratification determined by the various 
classes’ relation to the means of production and the manner in which surplus is 
accumulated; and the one of anarchy that arises from an international 
environment populated by independent units in which a supranational authority 
is absent.95 Indeed, if one seeks to follow the mixed mode approach that views 
both the forces and relations of production as constituting the economic structure 
of society that pertains in any given epoch, then a trans-historical generative 
process needs to added – that of technological development.  
 
However, there is a qualitative difference between these two trans-historical 
generative structures. Social stratification has a multitude of variations 
depending on the particular classes that pertain at any particular point. Just as 
Marx’s work has been interpreted as identifying various ‘trans-historical abstract 
categories as the foundation for the construction of historically specific 
categories’, one can argue he also identifies a trans-historical generative structure 
(stratification in terms of the social relations of production) which serves as the 
foundation for the construction of historically specific class formations associated 
with a given historical epoch. 96  Inter-class and intra-class antagonisms (the 
vertical and horizontal dynamics) and their outcomes will thus vary throughout 
human development and will depend upon the class configuration and forms of 
exploitation that attain at the time, the specificity of which can only be acquired 
through detailed historical analysis.  
 
The anarchical structure, on the other hand, has a binary quality – either the 
environment is anarchical or a supranational authority exists. As Derek Sayer 
alerts us, structures can be said to be ‘”invariant under certain transformations”, 
that is, they can continue to exist while their constituents undergo changes in 
attributes which are not relevant to their reproduction’. 97  In this case, state 
attributes may vary considerably across history but as long as the most relevant 
attributes of anarchy remain unchanged (absence of a supranational authority in 
an environment populated by units seeking to survive), then the reproduction of 
this structure will continue. Here we need to differentiate between this structure 
and the behaviour it induces. Given the ‘unresolvable uncertainty’ concerning 
other states intentions, these units/states, if they wish to survive, must fall back 
on self-help forms of behaviour thus producing a competitive dynamic into the 
system whereby they seek to increase their power vis-à-vis other units, ‘building 
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up their own capabilities (internal balancing) or by aggregating their capabilities 
with other states in alliances (external balancing)’.98 The actual manner in which 
they do so will clearly depend on the mode(s) of production pertaining at that 
particular point which will be reflected in the mode of inter-state competition at 
the international level. In other words, it is necessary to differentiate between the 
anarchical structure and the competitive behaviour it induces and the actual 
mode(s) of inter-state competition.  
 
Such an approach would thus incorporate the important insight that Benno 
Teschke makes when he identifies different ‘modes of operation of diverse 
geopolitical orders’ that pertain in different historical epochs.99 Moreover, his aim 
to demonstrate, ‘how international relations are internally related to politically 
instituted class relations (social property relations) and how geopolitical 
pressures affects the course of socio-political development…the economic and 
the political, the domestic and the international, are never constituted 
independently of each other’ is consonant with this paper.100 But, this paper 
argues that the modes of operation of diverse geopolitical orders, represents the 
variation in outcomes of state behaviour rather than the anarchical structure per 
se – what this paper refers to as the mode of inter-state competition. 
 
In other words, this alternative form of Structural Realism diverges from the 
original in arguing that the deep structure – the fundamental ordering principles 
of the international political structure – remains unchanged. Furthermore, this 
anarchical structure is said to induce competitive self-help behavior for the 
states/units that populate this environment. However, the form that this 
competition takes will vary according to the internal composition of these states. 
The nomenclature ‘logics of anarchy’ is thus a misnomer derived from an 
analytical error and this paper argues it should be replaced by ‘modes of inter-
state competition’. However, this alternative approach does incorporate other 
important insights concerning the interaction capacity of the system as a whole 
and the variation in state form both temporally, but also variation within the 
system at any given point in time. Thus, states can vary in terms of their internal 
mode(s) of production in different historical epochs but also within any give 
historical epoch. Indeed, articulations and possibly combinations of various 
modes of production are likely to exist. One may have such variation with the 
proviso that these political units have in common one key function – that of 
security provision. 
 
Although, the fundamental ordering principle of the international remains 
unaltered, the geopolitical behaviour of any given state will, of course, reflect its 
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internal composition and the maintenance/transformation of any mode of 
production will be affected by the geopolitics of the era. Teschke is therefore 
quite right to argue that ‘the economic and the political, the domestic and the 
international, are never constituted independently of each other’.101 However, it 
is important to emphasize that, due to the variation of production forms within 
any given epoch – one cannot simply deduce from the dominant mode of 
production the dominant mode of inter-state competition, First, because, as 
Trotsky points out, curious amalgams of modes of production will emerge 
within states from the mimetic process induced by inter-state competition. 
Second, across the system there will often be a variety of dominant modes of 
production related to different states at any given point. Finally, the interests of 
the dominant actors associated with a given historical epoch will be refracted 
through the possibly separate social strata of state elites.  
 
Thus the identification of long term tendencies does not imply constancy in state 
forms and their internal modes of production across time and space. Nor does 
this approach have to necessarily fuse with the ‘logic of rational choice as a theory 
of operation’ in order to provide an historicized account of international relations. 
Indeed, Waltz’s theory does not make this type of rationality assumption; rather 
the emphasis is upon an external environment that punishes those states that do 
not respond to such systemic pressures efficiently.102  In Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s 
felicitous phrase, states are ‘free to die, but it is the choices they have made vis-à-
vis themselves and others that determine that outcome, not anarchy itself’.103 The 
emphasis is thus on a type of evolutionary game theory rationality which, if 
states are to survive, are obliged to follow.104 So, although Neorealism and the 
original Structural Realism have little to say about state modalities, one can 
extrapolate for the current argument that the maintenance or increase in a state’s 
relative power will depend on it adopting the most efficient mode of production 
that pertains at any given time or indeed a unique amalgam that may sustain its 
relative power position. Crucially, however, this mimetic process depends on the 
interaction capacity of the system. If it is high, those states that do not respond to 
the competitive environment by further power accumulation will find their 
relative power declining and will suffer the consequences (subordination, 
conquest or outright annihilation). However, if the interaction capacity is low, 
depending upon their geographical position, such consequences are not 
inevitable.  
 
By treating modalities of production and modalities of inter-state competition as 
inextricably bound together, it may also be possible to solve one of the 
unresolved debates within the neorealist literature between the ‘defensive 
Page 23 of 38
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gieh Email: criacis@hermes.cam.ac.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
 24 
realists’ and ‘offensive realists’.105 On the one hand, defensive realists argue that 
states merely seek the, ‘minimum level of power that is needed to attain and to 
maintain their security and survival’.106 On the other hand, offensive realists 
argue that states ‘seek to survive under anarchy by maximizing their power 
relative to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-defense. Relative 
power, not absolute levels of power, matters most to states. Thus, states seek 
opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power 
position. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to accumulate more 
power at the expense of rivals’. 107  Despite starting from the same basic 
assumptions about the nature of the international environment, these two 
schools therefore differ in their predictions of state behavior. Yet, if we allow for 
a range of behaviours depending upon the historical epoch that states find 
themselves in, it may be possible to overcome this conundrum. 
 
For offensive realists, relative to their power capabilities, states will endeavor as 
much as possible to control their external environment in order to reduce the 
possibility of security threats and to maximize the accrual of surplus. (within the 
confines of any given mode of production). 108  This version of Neorealism 
therefore predicts that states will extend their ‘sovereignty frontier’ as far as their 
relative capabilities will allow.109 Combined with a Marxist analysis, the mode of 
power exhibited by states both in their method of power accretion internally and 
the expansion of that power externally can be said to be conditioned by the 
dominant mode of production within their borders. State elites will thus project 
state power by extending their ‘sovereignty frontier’ to the extent that their 
relative power will allow them, but the form that this extension takes will 
depend upon the historical epoch under consideration.  
 
For example, the tributary mode of production was inherently expansionary 
given its dependency on subaltern states transferring part of their wealth on a 
regular basis to the regional hegemon. And, as Callinicos has already pointed out, 
under feudalism, the state acted as ‘an expanding super-lord whose growing 
military and fiscal capabilities compensated for the declining extractive powers 
of individual lords’.110 Similarly, the empires of the 19th century sought to extend 
their sovereignty frontiers through both a mixture of free trade arrangements 
and the physical possession of overseas territories in order to facilitate the 
incorporation of these entities into the capitalist mode of production. In part, this 
reflected the embryonic stage of capitalism and the fact that, in the majority of 
the world, preceding modes of production predominated and the appropriate 
economic conditions and the political-legal structure to secure trade were non-
existent. Although the preference may have been for ‘trade not rule’ the 
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conditions that pertained elsewhere necessitated the policy of ‘trade with 
informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary’.111 In the absence of 
appropriate legal regimes at the international level, inter-state competition 
descended into a scramble for direct territorial control.  
 
In contradistinction, after the Second World War, the US experienced a unipolar 
moment in which it found itself relatively unchallenged and the majority of the 
world already integrated into and conditioned by capitalism. As the 
preponderant power, it was able to promote a sovereign state form across the 
world that replicated the division of the political and economic spheres that 
pertained in the vanguard capitalist states. Given the particular form of property 
relation associated with capitalism, the territorial expansion of states’ 
sovereignty frontiers became redundant. The emphasis thus shifted to the 
expansion of capitalist property relations through the establishment of a 
necessary global architecture – the political-legal superstructure required for 
capitalism to operate smoothly – and the creation of the first truly global empire 
of civil society. 112  As a result, state behavior shifted away from power 
maximization towards securing this global economic architecture in order to 
maintain the lead states’ relative power positions. 
 
However, the creation of this global architecture and its replication of the 
political and economic divide at the domestic level have not ameliorated the 
contradictions inherent within the capitalist mode of production – namely 
competing capitals and the long term decline in the rate of profit. Even during 
the Second World War, US elites were concerned about a possible post-war 
slump which would mean ‘Unmarketable surpluses of all kinds of goods will 
accumulate and export markets will be sought to relieve the situation and to stay 
the decline in the standard of living of our people’. 113 The European recovery 
thus served as an important outlet for US spare industrial capacity and capital 
over accumulation.114 Moreover, Europe and Japan were permitted some relative 
gains in their economic and military power in order to serve as a bulwark against 
the Soviet Union and China. The inevitable decline in the rate of profit which 
finally came home to roost in the highly industrialized countries in the late 
sixties/early seventies led to a further outpouring of capital to those areas that 
provided far cheaper factors of production. 115  Thus, uneven and combined 
development has led to the emergence of alternative centres of power which, 
although unable, as yet, to individually challenge the US, has led to hegemonic 
decline and an uncertain future for the global system established after the Second 
World War.116 
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This paper further suggests that if this alternative Structural Realist approach is 
to be fused with Marxism a positivist methodology associated with Neorealism 
should be replaced by a Scientific Realist methodology. This would appear to be 
closely aligned with Marx’s own method.117 Essentially, this involves the familiar 
process of retroduction whereby the researcher attempts to explain identified 
patterns of occurrences by establishing a hypothetical model regarding the 
possible generative mechanisms causing such phenomena.118  Retroduction thus 
constitutes a form of ‘inference in which events are explained by postulating 
(and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them’.119 
 
Moreover, Scientific Realism rejects the ‘positivist limitation of scientific ontology 
to the observable’.120 Rather it attempts to explain ‘observable phenomena by 
describing the mechanisms and structures through which various often 
unobservable entities possess the “power” to generate these occurrences’. 121 
Given the anarchical structure of the international so often referred to is actually 
not directly observable, this methodology is far better suited to the theoretical 
challenge than Waltz’s positivism (or at least ‘hybrid’ positivism).122 It is also 
acknowledged that, in the sphere of Social Science, it is unlikely that we will 
identify certain universal laws and that it is more appropriate to speak of 
tendencies (an appreciation that one needs to take account of the agential aspect 
of what is being studied). Yet, the task of the Social Scientist remains that of 
identifying social regularities and developing hypothetical models that help in 
understanding the generative mechanisms behind such surface phenomenon. 
This approach also adopts an iterative methodology because ‘Science is seen to 
proceed through a constant spiral of discovery and understanding, further 
discovery, and revision, and hopefully more adequate, understanding’.123 
 
Scientific Realism therefore fits well with the approach argued for in this paper. 
It is clear that neither Marxism or Structural Realism on their own provides a full 
account of the causal processes at work in the world system. Both identify 
different generative mechanisms which explain certain aspects of social change, 
but once combined they provide a far better explanation of regular patterns of 
social phenomenon. A fusion of Marxism and the alternative version of 
Structural Realism presented here should thus be seen as part of the iterative 
process of scientific investigation that researchers engage in. There are, however, 
two problems associated with this approach. First, there is a danger that the 
insights of Structural Realism are simply bolted on to the previous findings of 
Marxist investigations. But this is not what is recommended here. Of course, the 
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generative mechanisms have been identified separately. But, the project at hand 
must now entail a root and branch re-writing of historical sociological analyses of 
the various epochs that treats inter-state competition as a necessary constituent 
element of societal formations/stratification and its reproduction and yet at the 
same time treats modes of production as a major constitutive element of the 
mode of inter-state competition. 
 
Such a theory identifies certain tendencies based upon the abstract generative 
structures, but in reality the outcomes may not always chime with our 
expectations. Thus, ‘the challenge is to show historically what constellation of 
sociopolitical forces struggled at any point in time over the control of the state, to 
establish which social interests prevailed, and to ascertain how the variable 
resolution of these conflicts shaped variable national and international strategies 
of accumulation and territorialization within a multi-state system whose anarchic 
structure and nationally differentiated development always posed problems of 
coordination and concertation’.124  However, in order to avoid a descent into 
‘historical inductivism’, such resolutions of conflicts need to be constantly 
compared to the outcome one would expect given the mode(s) of inter-state 
competition and the mode(s) of production pertaining to the period under 
consideration and to provide further explanation if these resolutions differ to the 
expected outcome.125 In other words, it is highly likely that the effects of these 
two generative structures will be mediated by other generative 
structures/mechanisms (state institutions for example) which then need to be 
taken into account. Such an iterative process will move the research further from 
the abstract to the concrete. 
 
If such complexities are to be captured, rather than simply adopt a highly 
abstract form of theorizing (the necessary abstraction from the concrete), uneven 
and combined development should also be applied to detailed historical 
explications of its various phases: genesis, structure, epochs and conjunctures 
(the necessary shift from the abstract to the concrete). Such analysis would adopt 
an open sociological framework informed by Marxian analysis, one that would 
acknowledge ‘the inherent complexity and contingency (or open-endedness) of 
processes of change in which human subjects are involved’.126  Such research 
should endeavour to fully encompass the concatenation of causal factors 
operating within a given period that have led to the identified outcome. Little of 
this complexity will be captured at the level of abstraction and there is the 
danger that if UCD is ‘extirpated from capitalism and projected into the 
stratospheric heights of the international…it will tend to lose it explanatory edge, 
acquiring the disabling aura of banality’.127 In order to avoid such an outcome, 
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this paper has argued that one must temporally slice the history of development 
not only into phases of genesis and structure for each mode of production but 
further into historical epochs and conjunctures. The mutable nature of uneven 
and combined development that is ultimately dependent upon the mode of 
production and inter-state competition renders high levels of abstraction rather 
unproductive, the suggested solution has the benefit of providing focus to an 
otherwise overly generalized and sweeping view of the historical process. 
 
The second issue is whether Structural Realism can be altered in such a fashion. 
This paper argues in the positive for such a change. In so doing, such an 
approach would avoid the methodological weaknesses of positivism associated 
with Neorealism and recognize the crucial effect states’ modes of production 
have on the modes of inter-state competition for any given historical epoch and 
vice versa. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Waltz has never quite explained how, if 
he is really adopting a positivist approach, the central generative mechanism – 
anarchy – is an unobservable entity, something that would be easier to 
incorporate into the methodological approach of Scientific Realism.  Moreover, 
the general theoretical abstractions avoid the charge of inductivism, while the 
iterative process of contrasting expected outcomes with historical record and 
introducing further specificity to the theoretical model where required, avoids 





Rosenberg is seeking to fulfill several objectives with his version of uneven and 
combined development: a better historical materialist account of the international 
than that put forward by Callinicos; a better account of international relations 
than Neorealism; and finally to actually explain the emergence of the 
international rather than treating multiplicity as a given social fact. In relation to 
the latter, Rosenberg makes a distinction between social multiplicity and political 
multiplicity.  
 
However, this paper has argued that the central characteristic of the international 
constituting the core problematique for International Relations scholars is the 
anarchic environment in which states/societies reside and that the emergence of 
such a condition precedes political multiplicity. As such, Rosenberg’s emphasis 
upon the emergence of social stratification is unwarranted. Instead, this paper 
has argued for a general theory of societal evolution that does not absent the 
international from its analysis, but takes it into account through the positing of 
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two trans-historical generative structures: social stratification and anarchy. From 
these two social structures, the inextricable intertwining of various modes of 
production and modes of inter-state competition are derived. In so doing, an 
alternative form of Structural Realism was suggested – one that could be fused 
with Marxism to provide an abstract theoretical basis for uneven and combined 
development. 
 
But such a fusion only represents the beginning of a root and branch revision of 
historical sociology. One that does not treat these modes of production and 
modes of inter-state competition as somehow constituted separately.  Further, 
the complex process of uneven and combined development requires a detailed 
breakdown into: the genesis and structural phases of the various modes of 
production/inter-state competition; and then to further divide this into 
distinctive epochs during the lifetime of various modes of production; and, 
finally, focusing on determinate historical moments.129 Such investigation must 
be an iterative process of increasingly deeper analysis that may identify 
additional factors that need to be incorporated. 
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